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ABSTRACT 
This report summarizes Phase II of a study of effective leadership behavior in company- 
level units (TPU's) in the U.S. Army Reserve. Extensive interviews were conducted in 16 
high-priority (FSP) units, focusing on effective/ineffective leadership behavior by company 
commanders. Results underscore the fundamental importance of leadership to unit readiness 
and retention. The report identifies leader behaviors that influence readiness and retention 
by building five key conditions in the unit- training quality, standards, coheslveness, confidence 
and respect in the leader, and support from spouses and employers. One finding involves the 
importance of the leader's time commitment to the unit Another involves leader behaviors 
essential to managing unit training, including availability to subordinates, planning and 
delegation, and protecting the plan. Another includes a three-stage strategy for turning 
around units with low standards. Another involves identification of three leadership values 
that tend to produce trust and confidence: mission, standards/accountability, and soldier care. 
Concrete best practices are cited for each effective leadership behavior identified. The report 
also identifies two "leadership traps" that several less-effective leaders fell into, involving 
micromanagement and punishment. The report concludes with several recommendations, 
including the need for leadership training. 
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
Units in the US Army Reserve are a major factor in battlefield success, serving as 
primary providers of combat service support for the Army and major providers of combat 
support. Especially important are those high-priority units designated Force Support Package 
(FSP) units-the focus of this study. 
Leadership, in turn, is a key factor in the readiness of Troop Program Units (TPU's) 
in the FSP. One of the primary factors affecting unit readiness is the turbulence produced by 
low retention. However, an earlier literature review (Thomas, 1995) noted a lack of 
knowledge of how specific leadership behaviors related to retention and readiness in TPU's. 
This report describes the findings of a follow-up study of FSP leadership designed to provide 
that knowledge, focusing on the unit commander. 
A. The Study 
The general staff of the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) were asked to 
select 16 TPU's that were representative of FSP units in terms of type of unit and geographic 
location, and evenly divided in terms of high or low attrition rates. Table 1 shows a 
breakdown of these units by type and by geographic region. For simplicity, we will refer to 
these units as companies, although a few were designated detachments. 
Each company was visited on a drill weekend. Interviews were conducted with 
an average of ten members of the unit, including the commander and other officers, first 
sergeant and other NCO's, unit administrator and other full-time staff, soldiers who were due 
to ETS soon, and newly-enlisted soldiers. 
Interviews were confidential and ranged from 30 minutes to 1 Vz hours. The 
interviewer asked questions concerning key conditions in the unit (described below). 
Interviewees were asked the current state of each unit condition, as well as what the company 
commander had done to create that condition. 
B. Value Added 
In this study we have tried to avoid "rediscovering" the general principles of 
leadership already found in Army Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 1990). Instead, this report identifies: 
1. Behaviors of special importance to company-level leadership in FSP units in 
the US Army Reserve. (This setting provides special challenges not addressed in the manual, 
which is intended for the active Army as well.) Concrete "best practice" examples of these 
behaviors are also woven through the report. 
2. Theories that are helpful in understanding our findings. 
3. "Leadership traps" into which some commanders fell. 
TABLE 1. BREAKDOWN OF THE 16 FSP UNITS STUDIED 












By Geographic Region (Time Zone) 
II.       LEADERSHIP MAKES A DIFFERENCE 
There was broad agreement that the company commander's leadership played a major 
factor in unit-level retention and in unit readiness. As one officer put it7 "Leadership is the 
long pole in the tent." Other officers, full-time staff, and senior NCO's were particularly 
aware of the commander's influence on their unit, and were able to cite many specifics. 
The attrition data used to select units did not prove to be a reliable indication of the 
quality of current leadership because of the time lag involved. These figures were based on 
the 12 months preceding the current drill weekend, and often diverged from current 
conditions in the unit-either good or bad.1 Nevertheless, it was not difficult to identify the 
effectively-led and less-effectively-led units in the study. After visiting several units, clear 
patterns emerged. Table 2 presents thumb-nail sketches of effectively- and less-effectively-led 
units. 
1
 Some gifted leaders going through turnaround situations, for 
example, had taken an early "hit" in attrition which stayed on the 
books for a year, despite low current levels. Some less effective 
leaders, in contrast, inherited low attrition rates from previous 
leaders despite high pending losses. 
TABLE 2. THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EFFECTIVELY-LED AND 
LESS-EFFECTIVELY-LED UNITS 
Effeaively-Led Units 
Formations start on time 
Few departures from training schedule 
Commander seems unhurried, is available to 
staff and soldiers 
Commander mostly out of the office, walking 
around, except for scheduled meetings 
Soldiers are rarely seen standing about idly 
Most weekends spent in field 
Bulk of training is in MOS skills, with much 
hands-on-training  
Training plan is sequenced to build 
competencies for later field exercises and 
annual training 
Training sessions well-planned and executed, 
with necessary materials present 
Few unexpected absences or rescheduled 
trainings (RST's) 
Less-Effectively-Led Units 
Formations often delayed~sr. NCO's and 
officers exchanging last-minute information 
Many significant departures from schedule 
due to unforseen developments 
Uniforms clean, pressed, are inspected at 
opening formation; no overweight soldiers 
People hold themselves accountable for 
outcomes 
Commander seems harried, operating in crisis 
mode, with people waiting to see him/her 
Commander is largely in office, responding to 
demands and doing paperwork  
Many soldiers waiting around for taskings or 
information (some dozing off)  
Few weekends spent in field (other than 
annual training)  
Much of training is on common task skills, 
rather than MOS skills 
Training seems mostly guided by upcoming 
inspections, is easily deflected by battalion 
interventions, reactive to outside 
developments 
Training activities often repetitive, falling back 
on default activities needing little preparation 
(reading from manuals, NBC, etc.)  
Many unexpected absences, to make up 
during the week (RST) 
Some uniforms in poor condition; some 
obviously over-weight soldiers  
Frequent conflict and blame over poor 
outcomes 
III.     CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 shows the general conceptual framework used here to organize our findings. 
It is based on the framework derived in the earlier report (Thomas, 1995), modified to 
reflect the findings of this study.2 It is easiest to understand the framework by working 
backwards from right to left. The main outcome variable is unit readiness--the ultimate 
leadership goal of the company commander. Unit readiness is shaped by five key unit 
conditions: training quality, enforcement of standards, confidence and respect in the leader, 
cohesiveness, and support from spouse and employer. The first four of these conditions were 
seen as crucial to the unit's readiness and retention, while the last, support from employer and 
spouse, was generally seen as helpful but not crucial. Because of their importance, these unit 
conditions are proposed as key intermediate leadership goals for the company commander 
(Thomas, 1995). That is, the company commander needs to monitor these conditions in the 
unit, and adopt leadership behaviors that produce high levels of these variables. The central 
research question addressed in this report, then, is the identification of leadership behaviors 
by the company commander that shape these unit conditions. 
The framework also recognizes the key role of the unit's enlisted retention rate in 
readiness. As shown in Figure 1, this retention rate is also shaped by the unit conditions in 
the framework, and in turn has feedback effects upon those conditions. For example, 
meaningful training causes more enlisted soldiers to remain in the unit, which then makes it 
easy to conduct more advanced and meaningful training for these more experienced soldiers 
(see Thomas, 1995). Likewise, unit cohesiveness causes higher retention, which means that 
unit soldiers have a longer history together, creating even stronger bonds. Thus, high unit- 
level retention can set up a self-reinforcing upward spiral in units, while low levels of retention 
2The following are significant changes to the original model, 
(a) Unit readiness has been added as the main outcome variable. 
The interviews made it clear that the unit conditions that increase 
retention are also seen as major factors in unit readiness. (b) 
Timely pay/benefits administration has been dropped from the list 
of unit conditions that are key factors in retention/readiness. It 
was clear from our interviews that the ADARS computerized pay 
system and direct deposit of paychecks (implemented earlier in the 
1990's) have markedly reduced the number of pay/benefits problems 
and the speed with which they can be corrected. Contrary to 
earlier studies in the 1980's, no one reported significant problems 
in this area, (c) Enforcement of standards has been added to the 
list of key unit conditions. The previous report (Thomas, 1995) 
suggested the likely role of this normative factor, and interviews 
consistently confirmed its importance. (d) To save space, 
soldiers' decision processes have been omitted from the diagram, 
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tend to set up downward spirals. 
Finally, the framework acknowledges that various situational factors also influence the 
unit conditions in the framework. Such factors as the type of unit, availability of adequate 
training facilities, unit location, unit history, and characteristics of the unit personnel may 
create special leadership challenges or opportunities for the unit commander in trying to build 
favorable unit conditions. 
IV.     THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF LEADER COMMITMENT 
The most apparent finding involved the sheer amount of time and energy required to 
be an effective unit commander. Commanders in our sample reported widely different 
amounts of time spent on unit business-from a low of four hours per week to a high of 24 
hours.3 These figures are based on non-drill weeks, and understate the actual workload on 
the commanders, since they do not include drill hours (MUTA's), the two weeks of annual 
training, or time away for schooling. The amount of time required was especially high for 
commanders trying to turn around units with low standards. One former commander who 
had successfully turned his unit around reported having spent an average of 40 hours per 
week during early stages of this effort. (This turnaround process is discussed in Section VI.) 
There was a clear, direct relationship between time commitment and effectiveness among the 
commanders in our sample. Being a TPU commander was experienced as a full-time 
responsibility, and as nearly the equivalent of a second full-time job by the most effective 
commanders. These effective commanders seemed committed to doing whatever was 
required to make their units truly ready and to bring these units up to standards. Some other 
commanders frankly told us that they would need to put in more time to do a first rate job, 
but were unable or unwilling to commit that much time. One commander estimated that it 
would take 15 to 20 hours a week to do his commander's job properly, but that he could 
only afford 9 or 10 hours. 
In a number of units, we heard stories of former commanders whose time commitment 
had been limited primarily to putting in their drill weekends and doing well enough to "get 
their tickets punched." It seemed clear that the conversion of these units to FSP status, the 
perception that these units are more likely to be deployed, and increased attention and 
monitoring of these units by their chain of command and the Active Army, has made this 
"part-time" commitment no longer feasible. 
Thus it seems especially important that prospective TPU commanders understand the 
level of commitment required of this position. Several of the more effective leaders in this 
sample had agreed to take on difficult, turnaround, assignments only because they were 
unmarried. Others reported the sacrifices they had to negotiate with their families, and their 
gratitude for having flexible civilian jobs and employers who supported their Army Reserve 
work. 
In the sections that follow, we will present our findings regarding the specific leadership 
behaviors that were seen as building each of the key unit conditions in the framework. 
We began asking this question after a few unit visits, so 
these numbers are based on the last eleven units visited. The mean 
number of hours per week for these units was 11.7. 
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However, it is important to remember that these are not labor-saving techniques or short-cuts. 
Nor will they work as an insincere facade. They require the high level of time and 
commitment we have tried to describe here. 
V.      BUILDING TRAINING QUALITY 
Here, we offer our findings on what quality training is, followed by a description of the 
leadership behaviors necessary to produce it. 
A.      What is Quality Training? 
Training is the general term for the work reservists do when not deployed. We 
found no significant differences between what the U.S. Army Reserve Command considers 
quality training and what enlisted soldiers found to be satisfying.4 To help understand the 
characteristics of quality training, we apply a model of intrinsic motivation developed by 
Thomas and Tymon (1993).5 Intrinsic motivation involves the rewards that individuals get 
directly from the tasks they perform. According to the model, those rewards come from an 
individual's sense of meaningfulness, progress, choice, and competence. 
Meaningfulness is soldiers' sense that they are pursuing a worthy purpose-that 
they are on a path that is worth their time and energy, are on a valuable mission, and are 
doing something that matters in the larger scheme of things. In our interviews, training was 
seen as meaningful when it obviously contributed to readiness for the unit's primary mission. 
In particular, soldiers found training in their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to be 
especially meaningful-as opposed to Common Task (soldiering) training. Limited amounts 
of common task training were seen as meaningful, but soldiers resented not being able to give 
most of their attention to their primary MOS skills.6   Training was also seen as more 
This conclusion is based on extensive conversations with 
members of the FSP Readiness Office at USARC on these issues, 
specifically those individuals on the general staff who visited FSP 
units to help improve their training: Maj. Joe O'Connor and Capt. 
Rob Doane. 
5This model is also being used by the Eighth Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation (8QRMC). For a description of this 
model prepared for 8QRMC and a general discussion of its 
application to the U.S. military, see Thomas and Jansen (1996). 
6One engineering company in our sample had been forced by a 
higher command to focus exclusively upon common task training for 
over a year. The results were disastrous in terms of attrition 
rates. In one sergeant's words, "I couldn't pick up a hammer for 
over a year!" This emphasis on primary mission is also consistent 
with the FSP Readiness Office's philosophy. Upon deployment, 
Reserve units routinely have additional days to polish their common 
task training stateside while their equipment is been shipped 
abroad. When facing the reality of deployment, motivation to 
attend seriously to common task training is also reported to be 
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meaningful when it was hands-on (that is, involved actually performing the activity rather than 
learning about it) and accomplished something of value for a "customer." In the Army 
Reserve, the term "HOT training" (hands on training) refers to both. Thus, Engineers 
especially enjoyed building roads or buildings for their communities or other units (as opposed 
to building something in a parking lot and tearing it down afterward) and Personnel units 
enjoyed working on personnel files for other units. (Notice that such training requires more 
time away from the drill center and more coordination with other organizations, as discussed 
below.) 
Progress is the soldiers' sense of accomplishment as they move forward on a 
task-the sense that their activities are really accomplishing something and that they are "going 
somewhere" (as opposed to spinning their wheels). Soldiers seemed most aware of progress 
when their training was organized into a plan with milestones along the way. For example, 
each set of activities would be designed to produce the skills necessary to perform still more 
complex tasks that would then enable them to do something particularly challenging at their 
two-week Annual Training (AT). It was important that the plan was actually adhered to, so 
that the training sessions were not seen as "wasted." Additional feelings of progress came 
from HOT training that produced visible products or appreciation from customer 
organizations. 
Choice is the soldiers' sense that they are able to use their own best judgment 
to accomplish a task-to select task activities and perform them in ways that make sense given 
their understanding of the task purpose and standards. In our interviews, NCO's commented 
repeatedly on the need for commanders to "let them do their jobs" to execute the scheduled 
training. E4's told us of their pride to be conducting a significant amount of training in well- 
led units. In general, delegating authority downwards allowed soldiers to take calculated risks, 
learn from mistakes, develop their decision making, and experience more ownership of the 
task. 
Competence is the soldiers' sense that they are skillfully performing task 
activities and that they are doing good, quality work on a task. The sense of competence was 
especially apparent in soldiers' stories of progressively more challenging tasks that they had 
been able to perform and master. Soldiers' pride in their competence also seemed to depend 
on leaders demonstrating that performance quality mattered, so that they were held 
accountable for quality work. Soldiers repeatedly told us that they appreciated it when a 
commander they respected was visible in their areas to see how training was going, 
interpreting this as a sign of interest in, and caring about, the quality of their work. Since 
training also includes decision-making and leadership activities by NCO's and junior officers, 
feedback and mentoring on these topics were also highly valued. Forms of public recognition 
considerably higher. 
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and awards also provided tangible evidence of competence. 
B.       Leadership Requirements for Quality Training 
We are using the word "leadership" in a relatively broad way, to capture 
different important facets of the leader's behavior.7 In this section, we offer our analysis of 
leadership behavior required to produce the kind of quality training outlined above. On the 
whole, these behaviors are concerned with the coordination of a complex set of tasks in a 
demanding environment. Our analysis is based largely upon Galbraith's (1973, 1974) 
information-processing model. 
1.       The Demanding Nature of This Setting. 
U.S. Army Reserve units are held to the same high standards of readiness 
as their Active Component counterparts. However, training time is much more limited-two 
days a month plus a two-week Annual Training. This shortage of time is key to understanding 
the TPU commander's challenge. Commanders spoke of the "38-day reality" or of "fitting 
40 hours into a 16-hour weekend/7 In short, there is almost no slack in this system. 
Commanders have to prioritize and plan carefully to utilize the limited training time. 
In addition, there are a great number of uncertainties that make it 
difficult to carry out plans. Many of these are from the soldiers in the unit Since they are 
not full-time members, they often encounter unexpected time demands from their civilian 
employers. They also commute sizeable distances, experiencing car breakdowns and traffic 
jams. Finally, they are free to walk away from the unit at any time if their job or family 
situation changes, or if they simply become dissatisfied with the unit. 
Other uncertainties come from outside the unit. Meaningful, hands-on 
training usually requires coordination with a variety of organizations-customers, suppliers of 
equipment and transportation, local governments, training facilities, and higher commands.8 
7Our broad use of the word corresponds to its use in the units 
we visited. In the academic literature, "leadership" is often used 
in a more constrained way. For example, in management theory, 
leadership is often described as one of four management 
"functions": planning, organizing, leading, and controlling. In 
the field of organizational behavior, leadership is often confined 
to a still narrower range of behavior, involving issues of decision 
making styles or styles of emphasizing task and people concerns. 
8We heard many complaints about multiple levels of higher 
commands that insisted on approving company off-site training, but 
were slow in approving or denying the commander's requests. In one 
case, a unit was two months away from AT but still did not know 
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In addition, FSP units are especially prone to short-term requests from higher-level commands 
who are strongly interested in their readiness. Thus, there are many visitors on drill weekends, 
requests for briefings to higher commands, and short-notice taskings. The severe time 
limitations in Reserve units make these disruptions more costly as compared to Active units 
by roughly a factor of 10. That is, in Reserve units, a lost day represents 50 percent (one 
half) of the monthly training schedule; whereas in Active units it would represent about 5 
percent (one twentieth). 
2.        Effective Leaders Are Available to Subordinates. 
These units face so much uncertainty that unit commanders must avoid 
adding to it by being unclear about how things are to be done. Thus, new commanders 
needed to spell out their policies, rules and procedures for subordinates to follow. Even more 
importantly, effective commanders were available and approachable for subordinates who had 
questions about these procedures or encountered situations where their application seemed 
problematic. Our interviews showed several cases of senior NCO's who found the 
commander's guidance vague, but were nevertheless blamed for perceived deviations from 
that policy. One more successful commander went out of his way, in contrast, to tell his 
subordinates that he fully expected them not to understand all of his guidance-perhaps even 
after repeated explanations. He promised to keep explaining when this occurred, and in 
return he held them accountable for asking questions when they did not understand. 
Clear policies enabled the unit's full-time staff to handle a number of unit 
issues on their own between drill weekends. However, with the uncertainties facing the unit, 
many issues came up during the month that had to be referred to the commander. Effective 
leaders made it a point to be quickly reachable by the Unit Administrator (full time 
administrative person) to respond to urgent issues and often called the unit to check in. They 
tended to stop by the unit frequently to confer with full-time staff and to work on issues that 
the staff had flagged for them. They also made it a point to do their own administrative 
paperwork before and after the drill weekend, so that they could be available to subordinates 
as needed during the drill weekend. Finally, they tended to have standard procedures for 
checking with platoon leaders and the first sergeant regularly between drills. All of these 
contacts provided mentoring opportunities as well as unit coordination. 
Without this availability, full-time staff and other subordinates were 
unable to transact much of the unit's work between drill weekends, or made mistakes that 
definitely how long the AT would be, so that the commander did not 
even know how many soldiers would be able to attend and how much 
equipment to take. During the last half of our interviews, this 
situation was compounded by the standing up of the Regional Support 
Commands, which created a "black hole" in the approval process for 
many commanders. 
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needed to be corrected later. There was also a large backlog of issues and a "paperwork 
blizzard" waiting for the commander on the drill weekend-and lines of people waiting for 
guidance. One commander recalled, "When I first came here, I had 30 guys lined up outside 
my office/7 
3.       Effective Leaders Plan and Delegate. 
Even putting in long hours, the commander has a limited capacity to 
handle decisions that are referred up the hierarchy. Effective leaders in our sample were able 
to push down more of these decisions to their subordinates. Several used the word 
"empowerment" to describe this process. Empowering subordinates reduced the load of 
operational decision making on commanders, freeing them for other activities like detailed 
planning, mentoring, "training the trainers," and walking around to observe training. It also 
enabled subordinates to practice and develop their own decision making and leadership skills. 
The amount of delegation depended in part upon the commander's trust 
in subordinates. Thus, effective commanders delegated less in the early stages of 
"turnaround" tours, and delegated more in later stages after soldiers had internalized higher 
standards. (See Section VLB.) 
Effective delegation also required the development of detailed training 
plans. These plans (together with unit standards and procedures) provided NCO's with the 
information needed to handle the decision-making authority delegated to them. All units are 
required to have yearly, quarterly, and monthly training plans. However, these plans differed 
in quality. In effectively-led units, as noted above, the plans built cumulatively toward the 
commander's vision of unit readiness. Each training exercise provided a foundation for the 
next, more complex, exercise, leading eventually to the most challenging exercises at AT~"the 
unit's superbowl," as one commander put it. To enable effective delegation, these training 
plans also had to spell out the responsibilities for each platoon in enough detail to serve as a 
blueprint for that platoon. These responsibilities, in effect, were detailed targets or goals for 
each platoon which, if met, guaranteed effective training for the unit as a whole. Platoon 
sergeants could then be delegated responsibility for making operational decisions to meet 
those goals in the way that made most sense to them. Training meetings during drill weekends 
provided an opportunity for each platoon to clarify its responsibilities and to voice its 
requirements from other platoons. Nailing down these details was especially crucial for more 
complex, off-site training exercises. 
Without this planning and delegation, senior NCO's were unable to make 
informed decisions. Commanders were forced to make a very high number of operational 
decisions~in essence becoming micromanagers. And again, there were long lines of people 
waiting to see the commander-with much idle time. While waiting for guidance, senior 
NCO's were forced to "wing it" on their own for their own squad and platoon training. 
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Complex training exercises proved infeasible, and the unit setded for simpler training in the 
drill hall. The lack of delegation also prevented NCO's from demonstrating their capabilities 
to the commander, which seemed to reinforce the commander's lack of trust in his 
subordinates and his felt need to continue to make a majority of operational decisions himself. 
We observed a number of commanders who seemed to be caught in this downward spiral of 
low trust and micromanagement, which seemed to be an important leadership trap for unit 
commanders. As one effective leader put it, "Micromanagement will snowball on you." 
4.       Effective Leaders Protect the Plan. 
As noted earlier, all units are required to have training plans. However, 
less-effective units seemed routinely to have to depart from their plans. The plans seemed to 
have the quality of a hope or best guess. In effectively-led units, in contrast, the commander 
went to considerable effort to protect the plan from disruptions-both inside and outside the 
unit Inside the unit, these commanders collected a great deal of information about how well 
training plans were being executed on drill weekends by walking around, talking with soldiers 
and observing events. In addition, they held their staff, first sergeant, and platoon leaders 
accountable for meeting their responsibilities. Deviations were taken seriously, and were the 
subject of follow-up meetings to learn from and correct the problem. Between drills, these 
leaders received regular briefings on preparations for the drill weekend-sometimes including 
phone calls from platoon leaders verifying the number of soldiers who would be attending. 
Most dramatic was the need for effective commanders to occasionally 
protect their training plans from higher level commands-most often from their battalion 
commander. Effective commanders did not easily accommodate short-term taskings that 
would damage their plans, and thus their readiness for later exercises and their AT. As one 
effective commander put it, "I'm not here to make my battalion commander happy." These 
commanders reported having to say, "Sir, I cannot support you," with explanations, on 
several occasions. Here, having a tightly-linked plan for meaningful training provided a 
convincing rationale. "My soldiers are loading trucks for next month's convoy to Fort 
Collins." When faced with orders from Battalion, commanders could pull out the training 
schedule and ask "What would you like me to give up?" 
In general, more effective leaders also protected their plans by 
proactively networking with other units that they depended upon. Several took the time to 
visit these organizations, educate them about the unit and its training needs, and ask them to 
visit their unit-especially on special occasions (dining-ins, dining-outs, ceremonies). They 
went to greater lengths to win support for their training plans from headquarters, established 
personal relationships with recruiters to help them obtain quality personnel on a timely basis, 
and so on. 
We were also impressed that effective commanders protected their plans 
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from being overwhelmed by the Operational Readiness Examination (ORE), administered by 
a branch of the Active Army.9 Effective commanders viewed this exam as useful feedback, 
but generally felt that if they followed their training plan the unit would do well on the exam 
anyway. Less effective commanders, in contrast, often allowed the ORE to dictate their 
training schedule for several months prior to the exam. In one such unit, soldiers generally 
felt that the time had been wasted, and attributed their efforts to the commander's desire to 
look good for promotion. 
5.       The Alternative is Defaulted Standards. 
When the commander was unavailable to subordinates and was unable 
to plan, delegate, and protect the plan, the unit was unable to meet all its responsibilities. The 
company simply defaulted on at least some acceptable standards of performance. Training 
quality and readiness declined. Deadlines (suspense dates) for reports were missed or report 
quality was substandard. Mentoring, schooling and promotions were neglected. Equipment 
maintenance suffered, and weight and physical training problems were not monitored or 
flagged for action. Attrition figures rose. The more effective leaders in our sample 
commented that NCO's and junior officers in these poorly-led units also learned dysfunctional 
leadership patterns that would likely cause similar problems in other units. 
9Much of this exam is a paperwork check of personnel records, 
vehicle maintenance records, etc. Commanders tended to feel that 
it was focused largely on "dotting i's and crossing t's" in these 
records. The stance of viewing exam results as useful information 
rather than a primary measure of readiness or a primary training 
goal is also recommended to commanders by members of the FSP 
Readiness Office in the USARC. 
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VI.     BUILDING STANDARDS AND COHESIVENESS 
The two unit conditions involving standards and cohesiveness will be discussed together 
here. These two sociological factors combine to form the "normative" forces in the unit that 
shape soldiers' quality of performance. "Normative" refers to perceptions of the Tightness or 
wrongness of behavior--of what soldiers believe they should do. It involves notions of duty, 
honor, fairness, and doing the right thing.10 Cohesiveness is the strength of the force that 
holds the unit together--the attractiveness of the unit to its members. 
Figure 2 shows the classic sociological description of the manner in which performance 
standards (norms) and cohesiveness interact to shape unit performance.11 When unit 
members find the unit highly attractive, they are especially likely to honor its norms. Thus, 
high performance occurs when there are both high performance standards and high 
cohesiveness in a unit. Several effectively-led units in our study had attained this condition. 
However, we also found a number of commanders who were trying to turn around 
units with low performance standards. In the remainder of this section, we will describe the 
characteristics of these units, leadership behaviors for building standards in these units, and 
then behaviors for building unit cohesiveness. 
A.      "Good Old Boy" Units 
There was much agreement between the stories told to us by commanders who 
had taken over these units. The units had been neglected by their previous commanders--in 
some cases by several generations of commanders. Army standards had not been enforced 
by these commanders, and the units developed lower performance norms. Over time, 
soldiers in these units (especially senior NCO's) had accepted these lower standards as proper, 
as part of an arrangement to which they felt entitled. Field manuals were seldom consulted 
for guidance, with NCO's making up their own procedures and teaching them to junior 
enlisteds. Often, senior NCO's (usually the Unit Administrator) had become the de facto 
leaders of these units. Upon taking command, new commanders were informed of this fact: 
"We pretty much run the unit Don't worry sir, we'll take care of you." One was told flatly 
by his UA, "I run this unit. This is my unit." 
10For more description of the distinctions between 
sociological, psychological and economic influences upon behavior, 
see Thomas (1995). 
nThis relationship was originally formulated by Seashore 


















Figure 2. Effects of Cohesiveness and Performance Norms on 
Group Performance (From Seashore, 1954). 
18 
With relatively low military standards, "getting along" (cohesiveness for its own 
sake) tended to be valued in these units-especially among senior NCO's. Retention at that 
level tended to be very high, with many approaching mandatory retirement. There was a 
significant degree of cronyism-with desirable schooling and other favors given to friends. In 
some cases, there were reports of falsifications of records to protect overweight friends, 
friends who could not pass physical training tests, or to maintain the appearance of equipment 
readiness. 
For junior enlisteds, however, there was often high turnover in these units. 
Attrition had been reportedly at 100% in one of these units, despite the high retention of 
senior NCO's-implying that junior people were turning over more than once per year on 
average. New recruits, in particular, were disillusioned and sometimes disgusted after arriving 
at such units following their basic training. Many of these young soldiers spoke with great 
emotion about how their lives had been turned around in basic training-how they had learned 
self-esteem and discipline, and expected to serve their country with honor in the Army 
Reserve. In these units, on the other hand, they found a lack of discipline, integrity, 
challenge, or worthwhile work. One said that the NCO's in the unit were nice enough and 
would probably do their best to protect him if deployed, but that he did "not have much 
confidence that they would know how." Others resented the favoritism and the fart that 
there were few promotion opportunities beyond E4, since senior NCO's did not retire. Still 
others resented having to carry most of the workload while senior NCO's relaxed on the 
job.12 
Commanders told us that these units had reputations within the local Army 
Reserve community. One first sergeant used the term "renegade unit" to describe his unit's 
former reputation. It appeared to be difficult to recruit new commanders for these units. 
B.       Leadership to Rebuild Standards 
We conducted a supplementary interview with a former company commander 
(now a battalion commander) who had established a reputation within USARC as an expert 
in turning around problem units.   His ideas on this topic were consistent with those of 
12We heard many stories about senior NCO's who had "retired on 
the job" and no longer carried their share of the unit's workload. 
Junior enlisteds were angry and frustrated at having to perform 
work while these NCO's sat in plain view, drinking coffee and 
chatting about sports. Soldiers told stories about having to pitch 
the NCO's tents for them when the NCO's themselves were idle. One 
soldier was going to leave the unit in part because of an incident 
in which he and other enlisted were called out of their barracks 
late at night to load a few rifles into a truck while a roomful of 
sergeants watched. 
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successful company commanders in our sample. We have organized this section around the 
three stages he identified.13 The stages overlap somewhat in practice, but the emphases are 
distinct. 
Stage 1: Taking Control and Evaluating. 
This initial stage was the most turbulent and psychologically demanding for 
commanders, but also the most critical. They regained control of the unit, put it back on 
track toward high standards, and performed the evaluation and diagnosis necessary for stage 
Commanders began by making a clear statement of their standards and 
leadership philosophy. Here, commanders spelled out the implications of being an FSP unit. 
They emphasized the likelihood that the unit would be deployed and the absolute need for 
the unit to be ready for that deployment-both to accomplish their mission and to bring back 
its members alive. This need provided the backdrop for enforcement of Army standards. 
Commanders spelled out the philosophy that they would use to lead the unit to a high state 
of readiness, trying to set clear expectations about their style and methods. 
Senior NCO's in these units had heard such speeches from previous 
commanders who had not followed through on standards, and were commonly skeptical at 
this point. So it was vital that the commander begin setting and enforcing standards. 
Common abuse areas involved rescheduled training (RST's), physical training, and weight. 
Commanders published the official Army standards on these issues and often took personal 
control of their enforcement at this stage.14 For example, a soldier noted that permission to 
miss a drill weekend and reschedule training (RST) for a later time had formerly been "passed 
out like Santa Claus passing out candy." The new commander reversed this practice by 
enforcing policies that severely limited RST's, reviewing all RST decisions personally, giving 
unauthorized absences to people who missed drills without advance notification, and giving 
authorized absences (without pay) to people who did give advanced notice.15 Attendance 
increased dramatically, allowing more meaningful training. With respect to physical training 
and weigh-ins, commanders often brought in outside evaluators to ensure objective 
assessments with respect to standards. Likewise, commanders personally reviewed personnel 
13T We have relabeled these stages for clarity, but have 
maintained their content. Most of the specifics discussed under 
each stage were obtained from successful company commanders in our 
sample, rather than from the expert. 
This was less true for commanders who come to the unit with 
a new first sergeant whom they trusted. 
15Our turnaround expert noted that in his current battalion, 
RST's went from 150 per drill weekend to only 10. 
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records to insure that problem cases were flagged for counseling and action. 
Commanders emphasized the need to expect resistance at this stage, especially 
from senior NCO's. New commanders were challenging the old norms and (low) standards 
that these senior members of the unit had come to accept as proper. These senior NCO's 
commonly called in Inspector General (I.G.) teams when commanders began to enforce 
official Army standards.16 Such I.G. visits helped the new commander by legitimatizing those 
standards and backing up the commander's decisions. 
During this stage, commanders assessed the current training plans and made any 
immediate changes that proved necessary to correct gross deficiencies. They also collected 
first-hand data on the status, of equipment readiness, weapons qualifications, familiarity with 
field manuals, suspenses, promotions, schooling, and soldier care. With respect to soldier 
care, new commanders commonly conducted separate "sensing" sessions with junior enlisteds 
(E-l through E-4) and senior enlisteds (E-5 and up). Among other things, these sessions 
surfaced areas of abuse or neglect of junior enlisteds-the level at which attrition had been 
highest, and where basic and MOS training had most recently instilled high standards. It was 
especially important to stop these abuses. One commander's message in counseling sessions 
was especially clear: "You mess with my junior enlisteds, you mess with me." Officers were 
also counseled and evaluated to understand their abilities and motivation to support the new 
program. 
Effective commanders spelled out a number of useful attitudes that had helped 
them during this stage. The first was, "Come in tough [firm], then you can lighten up." The 
second involved the need to be fair to all members of the unit-including the most resistant 
ones. Thus, many commanders mentioned the need to be "firm but fair." Here, it was useful 
to keep in mind that the lowered standards were not primarily the fault of these NCO's, who 
had attempted to fill the leadership vacuum formed by years of neglect by previous 
commanders. It was also useful to realize that these NCO's were held in high esteem by many 
members of the unit In this setting, being fair meant treating these senior NCO's and others 
with the respect due their status and experience: "You have to respect anyone who's been 
in twenty years." So effective commanders listened to the views of these soldiers, tried to 
convince them of the necessity for the higher standards, and in general tried to win them over 
to become successful allies in the rebuilt unit-but without compromising Army standards. In 
contrast, some less effective commanders fell into the leadership trap of trying to be "tough" 
16Some of these I.G. incidents served to dramatize how, over 
time, unit members could come to accept conditions as proper that 
were widely divergent from USAR standards. We heard stories of 
fraternization and gross obesity, for example, in which offending 
soldiers called in I.G. teams for (unsuccessful) support when a new 
commander began to enforce standards. 
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and "drive out the lazy ones." These commanders criticized or punished senior NCO's (and 
sometimes the whole unit) in public, stopped listening to soldiers, and were seen by unit 
soldiers as "playing gotcha" rather than trying to make soldiers successful. As a result, these 
new commanders were seen as tyrannical and failed to win the support of most of the 
command.17 (For more on this trap, see Section VII.C4.) 
Nevertheless, despite commanders' best efforts to be fair and to "salvage" 
existing personnel, significant losses of personnel seemed inevitable during this stage. Some 
individuals left because they were afraid of deployment, others because of the new standards, 
and some were counseled out. On the whole, those who left were seen as significantly less 
valuable assets than those who remained. Effective turnaround commanders were willing to 
take this "early hit" in attrition in order to improve the unit. They also made sure to prepare 
their superiors for these losses and to get advance approval for their turnaround strategy. 
Stage 2: Rebuilding. 
The emphasis in this stage was upon systematically setting and attaining 
standards in all areas of the command-and setting up the management/leadership structures 
needed to support this. Much of this stage, then, involved the leadership activities discussed 
in section V. Workable standard operating procedures were established and detailed plans 
and standards/goals were set for different areas-including training, equipment readiness, 
weapons qualifications, and meeting suspenses. Mislaid field manuals were located or 
reordered, and soldiers were required to master them. Standards of professionalism were also 
set.18 People were held accountable for these goals. As junior officers and senior NCO's 
demonstrated their commitment and ability during this stage, they were given progressively 
more authority to make the decisions necessary to achieve these goals. Gradually, 
accountability and empowerment were pushed down to lower and lower levels in the 
command, freeing more of the commander's and senior NCOs' time for planning and 
mentoring. Commanders reported that attrition began to decline steadily at this point. 
As part of enforcing standards, this phase involved more systematic counseling 
of subordinate officers and NCO's. These individuals were now held accountable not only 
In one such unit, a number of soldiers began their interviews 
by saying, »I'm not stupid!," reflecting how they had been treated 
by the new commander. 
18For example, many NCO's in one command had a habit of 
complaining about how "hosed up" things were, and how "nobody 
cared." The commander pointed out the destructiveness of this 
habit and set a new standard: "If you're going to say something 
negative about a problem, you need to say something positive about 
how to fix it." This standard was enforced and became a part of 
the unit's culture. 
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for their own behavior, but also for the behavior of squad leaders under their authority. 
Effective turnaround commanders made it a point to give positive recognition for achieving 
standards. However, patterns of repeated deviations from standards resulted in very direct 
(but polite) questions about commitment- "Do you really want to be here?" The 
unacceptability of repeated deviations was also explained clearly: "This is where we're at; this 
is where we want to get; and here is my plan for getting there. If you can't make a 
commitment to this, you don't have a future here."19 Successful turnaround commanders 
commonly reported having to reshuffle and replace at least a few key personnel-officers, 
senior NCO's and occasionally full-time staff.20 
Stage 3: The Pavoff. 
Stages 1 and 2 were remedial and resulted in getting the unit up to standards. 
Stage 3 was the payoff. Units at this stage were able to conduct advanced and challenging 
training that was exciting for soldiers. There was time for officers and senior NCO's to praise 
and reward soldiers. Commanders and other unit members told us proudly that soldiers in 
the unit now did their own recruiting. The unit established a very positive reputation in the 
local Army Reserve community, and many soldiers now requested to transfer in from other 
units. It was especially gratifying for unit commanders that many good soldiers who had 
previously transferred out of these units because of low standards now wanted to rejoin them. 
During this stage, the unit's high standards became internalized by soldiers at all 
levels, and became part of the unit's culture. When deployed, one commander pointed out, 
this meant that the unit would be able to carry out its mission and maintain high standards 
even if key leaders were lost. 
19For more on effective commanders1 approach to counseling, see 
section VII.C.4 on 'tough love/ 
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°Some commanders were also very proactive in dealing with 
recruiters, to make sure that people could not automatically 
transfer into the unit from other units or. from the Individual 
Ready Reserve. The objective here was to make sure that 
undesirable reservists with low standards could not get into the 
unit. As one first sergeant remarked, "You can't kill a 
reservist." Poor performers can continue to circulate between 
units, wasting the unit's time and.adding to its attrition numbers. 
Thus, some commanders ensured that they were able to interview and 
reject these applicants before they showed up on their rolls. 
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C.      Leadership to Build Cohesiveness21 
As noted above, cohesiveness is the strength of the force that holds a group 
together-the bonds between group members. We found that commanders viewed 
cohesiveness as very important, but that, with some exceptions, they did not give a great deal 
of thought to building cohesiveness per se. This seemed to be because they saw cohesiveness 
as largely a byproduct of other unit conditions they strove to create-quaiity training, high 
standards (especially reducing RST's), and confidence/respect for the leader. Cohesiveness 
is produced by rewarding or challenging events shared by a group over time. Reducing RST's 
increased attendance, producing more shared group experiences. Quality training made those 
shared experiences positive. (Soldiers especially commented on successful AT's and 
deployments as contributing to cohesiveness.) Confidence and respect in the leader also 
helped solidify the group (see section VII). Commanders also stated frequently that 
cohesiveness was more important at lower levels of the unit-squads and platoons. It was in 
these primary work groups that the strongest bonds were formed between soldiers. 
Nevertheless, effective commanders did take some actions focused squarely on building 
cohesiveness in their companies. 
1.       Creating Enjoyable Company-Level Activities. 
Effective commanders frequently mentioned the importance of 
conducting PT as an entire unit Staging competitions between platoons was a way of creating 
drama and excitement during PT.22 Competitions (with meaningful awards) were also staged 
on other mission-related areas, such as vehicle maintenance. Unit parties or Coke busts were 
sponsored at the end of a long day on field exercises or at AT. One commander staged a 
highly successful, voluntary "dining-in" shortly after AT at which the company celebrated its 
AT successes and its traditions. Other commanders sponsored community involvement 
activities, such as blood drives, which generated shared pride among unit members. Family 
activities were also important sources of cohesion, but will be discussed in more detail in 
We found a number of very cohesive units that commanders 
acknowledged they could not take credit for. These units had been 
cohesive for as long as anyone in the unit could remember, and had 
developed a culture of care and support for each other. These 
units were commonly described by unit members as being "like a 
family," and new recruits were taken care of and welcomed by older 
members. This cohesiveness was viewed as an important resource by 
new commanders, who then focussed on training quality and 
standards. 
220ne commander pointed out the usefulness of combining pairs 
of platoons into two larger teams. This built bonds between 
platoons, and also allowed the commander to "balance" the abilities 
of the teams--by pairing the strongest with the weakest platoon. 
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section VIII. 
2.       Introducing New Members to the Unit. 
Effective commanders placed special emphasis on the treatment of new 
members-especially non-prior service members, where attrition tends to be highest. They 
made sure that new members felt welcome and comfortable, and that they were integrated 
into the unit's activities. They sponsored active newcomer orientations, where new recruits 
were briefed by all leaders. The commander also made sure to meet with new recruits 
privately and to ensure that they felt welcome. Some commanders gave their home phone 
numbers to new recruits. They made sure sponsorship programs were working effectively. 
One commander noticed that new recruits were often intimidated by the E-5's who had been 
serving as sponsors, and made sure that recruits were shown around the unit by E-2's or E-3's, 
with whom they could talk more freely. New recruits were impressed with the skills that these 
junior enlisteds had learned in a short time-raising their own expectations. 
In a number of units, we noticed special problems with new recruits in 
split option programs-young recruits who had signed up before high school graduation, and 
who therefore had to wait up to one year for their basic training. They commonly felt 
uncomfortable in the unit, since they did not have uniforms, did not know such basics as 
saluting and how to stand in formation, were often excluded from training, and wasted a lot 
of time "riding the couch" waiting for a menial assignment. Effective commanders made sure 
that they were integrated into command activities, finding a basic set of uniforms for them and 
making sure that they were trained in basic soldiering skills. Volunteer NCO's were found to 
train these recruits, who, because of this early training, often received honors during basic 
training. These honors were then celebrated when they returned to the unit after basic 
training, and were a source of pride for these young soldiers, for the NCO who had trained 
them, and for the unit as a whole. 
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VII.    BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND RESPECT IN THE LEADER23 
While the section above involved standards that commanders required of soldiers, this 
section involves standards that soldiers required commanders to meet. There was an obvious 
reciprocity here: soldiers' willingness to meet their commanders' standards depended on 
commanders meeting the soldiers' standards. The ultimate in confidence and respect was one 
prior-service sergeant's statement that he "would follow [his commander] into Hell." We 
found that confidence and respect depended upon expertise, fairness, and the leaders' values. 
A.      Demonstrating Expertise 
Over time, commanders' expertise was apparent to soldiers from the quality of 
their decisions and the overall state of the unit However, effective commanders paid 
attention to soldiers' early judgments of their expertise or credibility. This was especially 
important for commanders who were trying to raise their units' standards, and were therefore 
challenged more by subordinates. Demonstrating expertise was generally easier for 
commanders who had extensive Active Army experience, who were trained in the same 
specialty as their new unit (M.P., Engineering, etc.), and who had served well in the same unit 
earlier. 
Effective commanders emphasized the importance of interviewing unit members 
and observing unit operations before making initial decisions--to avoid making bad decisions 
from which it would be hard to recover. Commanders moving to units with a new technical 
specialty also reported the necessity of identifying their expertise when it was questioned, as 
well as placing an early emphasis on those things they knew well, such as common task 
training. One commander explained to his senior NCO's how his prior experience as a tank 
commander would be relevant to their transportation unit. Other commanders mentioned 
the importance of acting confident: "How can I expect them to support a decision, if I don't 
seem to believe in it myself?" 
However, effective commanders also made sure that they developed real 
expertise in their new technical specialty as quickly as possible. This included advanced 
courses, mastering field manuals, and having NCO's conduct training sessions for the 
commander and other officers. These "train the officers" sessions were often a source of 
pride for the NCO's who performed them. 
23, 
Based upon the literature review in the previous report 
(Thomas, 1995), we initially began asking questions about soldiers' 
"trust" in the commander. It quickly became apparent that the term 
"confidence and respect" was more meaningful to US Army Reserve 
soldiers. 
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B. Being Fair 
This topic was extremely important to soldiers, and was a primary source of 
anger and disrespect for less-effective leaders. In our interviews, commanders tended to talk 
about fairness issues in terms of "leading by example." Their subordinates spoke passionately 
about the same issues in terms of "double standards" or "acting like they're better than we 
are." In some units with less effective leadership, we heard the same stories about the 
commander's double standards from many different people. It was clear that such stories 
were widely shared among soldiers in the unit, and had powerful effects on soldiers' 
confidence and respect in the commander. 
Effective leaders went to great lengths to avoid the sort of cronyism that was 
prevalent in "good old boy" units. Two of the most effective leaders in our study had 
relatives in their units-a brother and a niece. Both announced this fact to their units in 
formation and stated that they would be even harder on those individuals to make sure they 
avoided playing favorites. 
Effective leaders also made sure that they were not seen as enjoying special 
privileges. They led by example in physical training and in weight control. It was apparent 
to soldiers in the command that they put in an extraordinary amount of time and effort on 
behalf of the command-more, in fact, than they asked of others. They also tried to share the 
discomforts of field exercises and annual training equally with their soldiers. Thus, unlike 
commanders of some other units, they did not shower when their soldiers could not, and their 
billeting (and those of the officers as a group) were equivalent to those of the enlisteds. These 
shared conditions, besides being fair, were a source of cohesiveness in the unit One M.P. 
commander rolled up his sleeves and performed maintenance on his Humvee on most 
occasions-a fact proudly told to us by several people in the unit. 
C. Leadership Values 
Issues of the commander's "leadership style" came up repeatedly in our 
interviews. By this, soldiers generally meant the way that the commander approached and 
treated them. In this section, we have tried to phrase our learnings in terms of the leadership 
values that underlie different leadership styles. By leadership values, we mean the things that 
commanders emphasized and paid most attention to in their interactions with subordinates. 
We found that much of the complexity of leadership could be reduced to three 
sets of values related to mission, standards/accountability, and soldier care. Figure 3 shows 
the "leadership space" defined by these three values. AH three seemed to be necessary for 
soldiers' confidence and respect in the commander. Effective leaders were systematically 
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attending to all three values. One gifted commander, for example, repeatedly stated that his 
job was to prepare the unit for "completion of the mission without casualties and to 
standards", integrating all three values into a simple statement known by all soldiers in his 
command. In contrast, commanders who were clearly struggling seemed to be systematically 
neglecting at least one of the values. 
Although translated into Army terms, these values are related to themes in the 
academic literature on leadership.24 They are also consistent with General Colin Powell's 
(1995, p. 185) conclusion that successful military leadership requires a "vision" (for 
mission), a "whip hand" (for standards and accountability), and a "chaplain" (for soldier 
care). 
1-       Valuing the Mission. 
Effective leaders were committed to the unit's mission and emphasized 
it as the fundamental purpose for being there. Their own commitment was apparent in the 
time and effort that they put into the unit (as discussed earlier). However, they also made 
mat purpose real and compelling for their soldiers: "Remember why you're here--to get ready 
to go to war." The reality of deployment was emphasized to new recruits. Exercises were 
related to possible deployments: "If we were in Bosnia, we would be . . ." Training was 
clearly aimed at preparing the unit to be able to handle that mission with confidence. 
Effective commanders developed a clear picture (vision) for their soldiers of what readiness 
would look like for the unit--in terms of being able to competently handle the mission. The 
commanders' decisions were made and explained in terms of their impact on achieving this 
vision. 
In contrast, soldiers saw other commanders as only paying lip service to 
the mission and being more interested in their own careers. They had little respect for such 
commanders. "If he cared, he would do a better job." "He is self-centered, arrogant, and 
a one-man-show. He's just using this unit as a stepping stone." "He's just here for himself~to 
get his ticket punched." 
We noticed that the commander's sincere emphasis on mission 
transformed the dynamics between commander and subordinates in important ways. The 
mission and vision provided a "pull" for soldiers and united them with the commander as allies 
and teammates. The mission also provided a criterion for making decisions. There was less 
24See the discussion of leadership in Thomas (1995), and the 
exhaustive literature review in Bass (1990). Accountability and 
soldier care are similar to the "task" and "people" dimensions of 
traditional leadership research, while mission is similar to the 
"vision" element of inspirational or transformational leadership 
theory introduced in the 1980's. 
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talk about power and ego. "This is not about me and you; this is about the mission." 
Commanders were more open to learning, genuinely welcoming better ideas. It also became 
important to give people honest feedback on their behavior, since the mission was at stake. 
One soldier proudly told us that his commander was "pro-truth." 
2.       Valuing Standards and Accountability. 
Whereas mission is about the unit's purpose, standards and accountability 
are about how it tries to achieve that purpose. A number of effective commanders spoke 
passionately about the importance of accountability-about people taking responsibility for 
their own actions, exercising self-discipline, caring about the quality of their efforts, "doing 
things right," and not taking the easy way out or merely trying to look good. For these 
commanders, then, accountability was about setting and living up to high standards of conduct 
and having personal integrity. Some of these commanders found great personal meaning in 
helping the young soldiers in their units develop the kinds of character that would help them 
throughout their lives. Some emphasized that the popular culture of the country had 
neglected accountability in recent decades, but that the country depended on the military for 
this basic value. 
We have already described (in Section VI B) how effective commanders 
set and enforced high standards for their units. Leading by example, they also set high 
standards for their own conduct. For example, they did not cut corners on procedures and 
were genuinely concerned with quality. "I would rather do three things well than five things 
poorly" was a common view. They honored their commitments to soldiers and welcomed 
constructive feedback on their performance. One commander regularly requested feedback 
from his first sergeant, unit administrator, and others whose opinion he respected. 
As noted earlier, the commander's emphasis on standards and 
accountability were especially important to soldiers with extensive active Army experience, 
and to new recruits who had just been socialized into these values in basic training.25 For 
these soldiers, standards and accountability were closely linked to a sense of honor and self- 
esteem. When commanders were successful in raising unit standards and achieving a sense of 
accountability, it seemed to transform relations between commanders and their subordinates 
by creating a shared sense of honor and of mutual respect. 
Effective commanders seemed to be especially aware of the importance 
of soldiers' sense of honor. It was clear to them that soldiers who were committed to the 
unit's mission and who demonstrated high standards and accountability were people of honor 
One first sergeant who had just transitioned from active duty 
to a Reserve unit told us that he had vomited at the end of the 
first drill day because of the low standards in his new unit. 
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and deserved to be treated with respect. One commander stated with great passion, "It is a 
privilege to lead these men!" and spoke at length about what unit commanders owed to such 
troops. These commanders praised their soldiers' quality to other commanders. They also 
honored their soldiers by keeping them informed and by listening to their views. 
Commanders also treated soldiers with dignity by taking care not to embarrass them. For 
example, these commanders would not override or second-guess their first sergeant's decisions 
in public unless an immediate safety issue was involved. One commander reported that he 
would take the sergeant aside to say, "This is not your best decision, but we'll do it this time. 
Next time, let's do it a different way." Another would wait until his evening meeting with the 
first sergeant to discuss the matter. 
3.       Valuing Soldier Care. 
Virtually all of the effective commanders in our sample commented at 
length on the importance of soldier care. The following quotes are illustrative. "If you care 
about them-genuinely-they will care back." "The most important factor is knowing people 
care about what happens to them." "95% of this job is keeping soldiers happy." 
Soldier care was important for a number of reasons. At one level, the 
unit's soldiers were important assets that needed to be protected and brought home intact. 
Taking care of soldier problems also removed distractions that interfered with their 
performance. At a deeper level, however, the more important reason for soldier care was to 
demonstrate to soldiers that the commander genuinely cared about them as individual human 
beings. This caring appeared to transform the relationship between commander and 
subordinates by creating strong bonds of personal affection and loyalty. Commanders and 
soldiers used family metaphors to describe these bonds-the commander was "like a father," 
and the unit was "like a family." In short, the unit became a psychologically important group 
where soldiers felt that they belonged and were cared for. (In this way, the leader's values 
also made an important contribution to group cohesiveness.) 
Effective commanders in our sample, then, spent considerable time and 
effort learning about individual soldiers and their concerns: "If you don't know that soldier, 
then you can't lead him." These commanders set aside office hours for this purpose and 
asked soldiers about their lives while touring workspaces. Commanders who were former 
enlisteds seemed to have a significant advantage in understanding soldier's needs and forming 
a personal bond. One commander made it a point to be able to call each soldier by name 
without looking at his/her nametag. Some commanders sent out Christmas and birthday cards 
to their soldiers. 
Of course, asking about soldiers' lives and problems wasn't enough: 
effective commanders made a point of finding help. "You have to be aware that people have 
crises at home. You're the father, mother and therapist." "Some of them are young kids, 
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struggling financially." With the help of the first sergeant and others, commanders helped 
soldiers find financial counseling, provided advice on various matters, and helped them get 
jobs. Commanders and first sergeants told us of many cases in which they had counseled 
soldiers to enter the active Army in order to escape dangerous neighborhoods and abusive 
home situations, or to get enough income to survive-even though it created a personnel 
shortage for the unit. They also found other, less dramatic ways of showing concern for 
soldiers-avoiding unnecessary physical dangers, providing quality food and well-maintained 
buildings, not keeping soldiers late, and avoiding scheduling training on dates that were 
important to soldiers (like college graduation weekends, holidays, or the Daytona 500). 
Family outings (see below) were also a time to take care of soldiers. One commander also 
emphasized the importance of mercy and compassion in the case of minor, isolated infractions 
by good soldiers: "What do I gain from giving a soldier a U for being five minutes late?" 
4.       An Important Example: Tough Love. 
An especially challenging task for commanders was dealing with 
subordinates who were failing to meet expectations. This challenge seemed to be a key test 
of leadership values and illustrated the importance of attending to all three values. 
One effective commander observed that commanders' thinking often 
became polarized when they faced this challenge. That is, they tended to feel that they must 
be either "tough" to uphold standards or "soft" to demonstrate their care for the soldiers 
involved. This kind of thinking appeared to be a significant leadership trap for commanders. 
Some opted for being soft, which resulted in the sacrifice of standards and accountability, as 
seen in "good old boy" units. Others opted for being tough, at the neglect of soldier care. 
This kind of toughness involved the use of frequent punishment and threats to attempt to 
force compliance with standards-showing anger, criticizing, namecalling (cry babies, 
irresponsible, lazy), being quick to process soldiers out of the unit, or even having the entire 
unit "drop for pushups." 
Effective leaders in our sample repeatedly warned us against the sort of 
punishment handed out by "tough" commanders. One said simply, "Discipline and 
disciplining [punishment] are incompatible." Another said, "I do not punish, yell, or 
threaten." Interviews with enlisteds showed that commanders who punished soldiers were 
often disrespected. One commander who, in his words, "got angry when people who should 
know better did things they shouldn't," was described by his troops as the kind of commander 
who would "get fragged by his own soldiers" in combat. It was apparent that this sort of 
punishment did not demonstrate soldier care and seemed to degrade soldiers' sense of honor 
and accountability. Several dedicated soldiers reported their strong sense of hurt and outrage 
over incidents in which they had been demeaned by their commanders in this way. 
The effective commander mentioned above stated that being tough or 
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soft was a false dichotomy. Another approach, which he called "tough love," integrated all 
three of the leadership values. He personally conducted "respect" classes for all his leaders 
on this approach. When using this approach, the commander first made sure that soldiers 
understood how the behavior in question detracted from the mission, and that the 
commander could not allow it to continue. If the problem was severe or persistent enough, 
the commander made the potential consequences very clear: if the soldiers could not change 
their behavior, there would be no place for them in the unit. This consequence was presented 
less as a threat than as a warning about what would have to happen. The commander also 
emphasized soldiers' accountability for their own behavior and for meeting unit standards. 
Here, soldiers were treated with dignity-as honorable adults who made their own decisions, 
rather than as children that had to be forced to behave in certain ways. It was understood 
that not everyone belonged in the Army Reserve and that there would be no disgrace in 
leaving. If the commander felt angry, he regained his temper (often in his office) before 
talking with the solders. Finally, the commander also showed care for these soldiers in various 
ways. The commander made it clear that he wanted to keep the soldiers in the unit if it was 
possible, and that he was willing to work with them to change their behavior if the soldiers 
were sincere. The commander also showed care by listening, and by making sure that soldiers 
understood the consequences of their behavior, trying to make sure that they were acting in 
their own best interests. 
It was apparent from interviews with soldiers that this tough love 
approach worked. Commanders who used this approach in our sample were respected, 
maintained high standards, and clearly seemed to be more effective than commanders who 
frequently punished soldiers. However, we were disturbed to learn that several of these tough 
love commanders had been criticized at least once by battalion commanders who confused 
their leadership style with being soft. For that reason, we were concerned that many of these 
battalion commanders were caught in the same leadership trap outlined above-equating good 
leadership with a readiness to punish. It was apparent that a number of superiors had 
provided leadership evaluations (and mentoring) that was at odds with our perceptions of 
what was happening in these units. 
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VIII.   BUILDING SPOUSE AND EMPLOYER SUPPORT 
As noted earlier, commanders seemed to regard this factor as important, but not as 
critical as training quality, standards, and confidence and respect. Some of our effective 
commanders-especialiy those in turnaround situations-did not give great attention to these 
issues until the other conditions were noticeably improving. Others found more time for this 
factor from the beginning. 
A.      Building Support from Spouses 
Virtually all units had some family events and also had a Family Care program 
on paper. However, commanders differed in the time and creativity they put into managing 
them, with some seeming to merely go through the motions. Soldiers reported that effective 
efforts in this area were very much appreciated. These efforts were also interpreted as soldier 
care, and were frequently cited by soldiers as contributions to unit cohesiveness. 
Family day activities varied between units. Almost all units had a Christmas 
event of some kind. Some units also had dinner-dances. Open houses worked well for units 
with particularly impressive equipment. Other units planned picnics/barbecues at nearby 
facilities. Off-site activities required more extensive planning to be effective, but seemed in 
general to be more satisfying. Soldiers complained that such events were "thrown together 
at the last minute" in some units. Soldiers in other units reported that it was important for 
authority for these events to be delegated to a senior NCO well in advance, that this NCO 
solicit other soldiers' ideas, and that the commander monitor the planning and give 
recognition and support for the project.26 
Soldiers also had much to say about the commander's participation in these 
events. It was apparent that some commanders were not using these events to build support 
from spouses, and thus defeated their intended purpose. In one unit, we heard repeated 
complaints about the commander missing one of these activities to go skiing. In another unit, 
we heard complaints about the commander attending only briefly and socializing with other 
officers, neglecting enlisteds and their families. We also heard reports of commanders who, 
when they did mingle, appeared ungracious to soldiers' family members, so that spouses left 
early to escape the tension. In contrast, we heard favorable stories of other commanders who 
supported these events and played the gracious host to family members. One commander 
bought his own Santa Claus suit and handed out presents to children. Others made it a point 
2 6 
In one unxt, with a number of poor soldiers, the commander 
and his_ first sergeant personally paid for much of the cost of a 
hotel dinner-dance for the unit, with soldiers paying only for the 
cost of their meals.  All senior NCO's proudly told us this story. 
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to talk with all spouses during the course of an event, expressing appreciation for their 
sacrifices. Some handed out certificates of appreciation. 
Family Support Programs, similarly, were more active in some units than others. 
Some commanders helped by sending a company newsletter home to families, meeting with 
Family Support Groups, allowing these groups to conduct bake sales in the drill hall to help 
raise money, and buying these baked goods to show support. 
B.       Building Support from Employers 
Some commanders provided little help to soldiers in dealing with their 
employers, regarding this as the soldiers' responsibility and simply holding soldiers accountable 
for attending drills despite employers' demands. However, we found a number of things 
commanders could do to help build support from employers. It seemed to help to provide 
the annual training schedule to employers well in advance. In addition, some of our most 
effective leaders called employers themselves when their soldiers experienced problems, which 
these soldiers very much appreciated. They explained the role of the unit, the importance of 
the soldier attending drills, helped work out solutions with the employer, and expressed 
appreciation for the employers' cooperation. Here, the commander had more clout with 
employers than many young soldiers had, as well as having the authority to make decisions 
about acceptable solutions. Commanders reported the usefulness of sending follow-up letters 
to employers after these conversations-to again express their appreciation and to document 
the agreement they had reached. Over time, these contacts served to build personal 
relationships between the commander and employers, making future cooperation easier. 
Some effective commanders used additional devices to gain the cooperation 
of employers. Some commanders sent certificates of appreciation to all employers. (In some 
units, employers had to be nominated by soldiers for these awards.) Employers were also 
invited to some unit events, including dining-ins and open houses, where they were recognized 
and honored for their support of the unit. 
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IX.     RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations listed below are those that we heard repeatedly during 
interviews or that flow directly from our findings. They are not presumed to be 
comprehensive. Likewise, because our data only involved company-level interviews, they are 
not informed by detailed knowledge of conditions at higher levels of command. For those 
reasons, we recommend the use of focus groups of commanders at different levels to 
supplement these recommendations and to develop concrete methods of implementing 
them.27 
A.      Building Leadership Knowledge and Skills 
These recommendations are aimed at providing new or prospective commanders 
with knowledge and skill practice to be effective leaders. 
1- Provide Leadership Training. There is a need for commanders to obtain 
information on effective leadership. 
a. Brief current FSP commanders on our results. 
b. Develop a pamphlet on leadership in FSP units that incorporates 
these results. 
c. Incorporate training materials on this content into courses for 
new and prospective company commanders. Commanders 
noted that the existing course for new commanders is focused 
largely on administrative matters. Suggest adding material on 
leadership, together with role-play and other exercises designed 
to practice leadership skills. 
2- Provide Leadership Mentoring. There is a need for commanders to 
receive mentoring or coaching from effective leaders. Commanders 
reported that USAR commanders receive less mentoring than their 
active Army counterparts, because of time limitations and distance. 
a. Build a capacity for leadership mentoring into the new 
readiness teams being stood up by USARC. 
b. Find ways of pairing Reserve commanders with their 
counterparts in the Active Army. 
As of this writing, the USARC is planning a series of 
workshops of FSP commanders and first sergeants to generate action 
recommendations from this report. We also suggest using focus 
groups of battalion and higher commanders to generate action 
recommendations from their vantage points. 
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3. Provide Leadership Feedback. There is a need for commanders to 
obtain regular feedback on aspects of their leadership. 
a. Develop measures of leadership and unit conditions that 
assess the material discussed in this report. These 
measures will include ratings by unit members. 
b. Collect this information and provide feedback to 
commanders on a regular basis. 
4. Provide lunior Officers with More Leadership Experience. Several 
commanders commented on the need for non-prior service officers to 
spend additional time as platoon leaders, or in battalion positions, before 
assuming command of a company. Exceptions can be made for high- 
performers. 
a. Extend platoon leader tours for non-prior service 
officers, and/or 
b. Rotate non-prior service platoon leaders into battalion 
staff positions before assuming company-level command. 
B.       Reward the Extra Effort Required of FSP Commanders. 
Our most effective leaders were not in the USAR for the money. However, 
these rewards would make their pay and benefits more equitable in view of their 
extra time and effort, would provide the extra recognition due them, and 
would make it easier for more leaders to justify a higher level of commitment. 
1. Provide Greater Pav and Benefits to FSP Commanders. The 
Tiered Readiness/Tiered Resource Plan developed by the USAR 
would allow this change for FSP commanders as a group. 
a. Provide FSP commanders with additional Unit Training 
Assembly (UTA) credits each month for the extra 
planning time required, beyond what non-FSP 
commanders receive. (Some additional credits should be 
made to other unit leaders as well). 
b. Reimburse FSP commanders for extra travel to and from 
unit and/or other sites when not in a paid status. These 
expenses, such as for visiting a possible field site, are 
currently "out of hide/7 
c. Pay FSP commanders and subordinate leaders for an 
annual "offsite" planning weekend. Consider making this 
event at a local resort facility, as a well-deserved perk. 
37 
2. Provide Extra Rewards and Recognition for More Effectivp FSP 
Commanders. Among FSP commanders, there is a need to provide 
accurate recognition for those commanders whose extra commitment is 
producing results. 
a. Use measurements of leadership and unit conditions as 
an important input for more accurate evaluation of 
commanders7 effectiveness. We heard too many stories 
of politically astute commanders getting promoted despite 
mediocre performance, while effective commanders were 
counseled to stop being so "soft." Several committed 
commanders appeared to be doing an effective job 
despite the lack of appreciation of superiors. 
Recommend that the feedback measures in 
recommendation A3a, above, be incorporated into 
performance reviews. 
b. Provide recognition and/or awards to commanders who 
exhibit exceptional effectiveness. Suggest this involve 
finding ways for these commanders7 stories to be told to 
other commanders and junior officers. 
c. Provide junior officers with a realistic preview of the 
time demands required of effective company 
commanders. 
C.       Provide Help for FSP Company Commanders. 
Our results suggest several ways in which, FSP commanders could be 
supported.28 
1 • Protect FSP Commanders from Unnecessary Uncertainties. There is 
a need to remove some of the intrusions that make it difficult for these 
commanders to plan their training and to stick to these plans. 
Here, we are not including logistics and technical support, 
such as better drill halls, more motor pool room, and access to 
hands-on training. Our interviews show that this support is very 
important to quality training. However, particular needs appear to 
be highly specific to particular units and types of units. As of 
this writing, USARC Readiness Office staff have been working on 
these issues. 
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a. Reduce the number of approvals required for field exercises. 
Delays caused by many levels of approvals were almost universal 
sources of complaint. Suggest empowering company 
commanders to make more of these decisions, and to much 
reduce the number of approvals for decisions that must be 
reviewed. Suggest the criterion for a required approval be "Does 
this add sufficient value for the company commander to offset 
the delay?" 
b. Reduce unnecessary taskings by higher commands. We heard 
near universal complaints about the sheer number of taskings 
added by different command levels. There is an apparent need 
for policies or other mechanisms to reduce these where possible. 
This is especially the case for last-minute taskings. Is it necessary 
for a line company that is co-located with its battalion 
headquarters to help fill in the battalion's change-of-command 
formations? Is it legitimate for that battalion commander or 
master sergeant to commandeer the company's soldiers for its 
own work details at the last minute? 
c. Provide information directly to the company via e-mail where 
possible. Important information was sometimes delayed by going 
through various layers of command-for example, a list of types 
of units eligible for reenlistment bonuses. 
2.       Provide Personnel Support. 
a. Reduce delays in outprocessing enlisted soldiers. Commanders 
often commented on the long delays here, leaving large numbers 
of "ghosts" on their roster that in turn prevented them from 
filling vacancies. These delays also made the unit attrition data 
we obtained from USARC an unreliable index of current 
conditions in the unit 
b. Consider using more active Army NCO's as full-time staff in 
FSP units. Commanders who had such NCO's commented on 
their credibility with soldiers, their commitment and extreme 
value in helping to raise standards, and their mentoring of other 
staff, NCO's, and sometimes officers. 
c. Consider giving FSP commanders more control over accepting 
recruits. Some effective commanders negotiated such 
arrangements themselves with local recruiters. It was especially 
important to be able to review soldiers wishing to transfer into 
the unit from the Individual Ready Reserve-to avoid soldiers who 
had repeatedly dropped out of other units. 
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d. Consider making retention NCO a formal reserve position. 
Retention NCO's (a collateral duty) seemed to provide 
important help in retaining new recruits, encouraging reenlist- 
ment, and in soldier care in general, but were forced to treat this 
task as a secondary responsibility. 
e. Consider providing additional pay/benefits to enlisted soldiers 
in FSP units. This is partly an equity issue, similar to the 
pay/benefit issue for commanders. 
3.       Help Commanders Be More Available to Unit Staff. 
Communications and information-processing equipment could help here. 
a. Provide FSP unit commanders with cellular phones and/or 
pagers. This equipment would help many commanders be "on 
line" for full-time staff. Having the USAR pay for this 
equipment would also help defray costs now born by 
commanders and their civilian employers. 
b. Provide FSP unit commanders with laptop computers that are 
tied into unit data bases. With modems and proper software, 
this would allow the commander to handle e-mail with the unit, 
but also to be able to review and work on personnel records and 
other unit data from home or work. 
Conduct Further Research. 
Now that the leadership factors in this report have been identified, it is 
possible to perform follow-up research to answer other applied 
questions. 
a. Consider quantitative research on the factors in this report. The 
measures in recommendation A3a would enable such research. Results 
would yield hard data on the relative sensitivity of readiness and other 
unit outcomes to different unit conditions and leadership factors, 
identifying high priority targets for interventions. It would also enable 
USARC to track the effectiveness of different training and other 
interventions upon these factors. 
b. Consider research on stress management for FSP company 
commanders. Our results document the heavy workload on these 
commanders from their USAR job plus a civilian job. There is a need 
to understand how some effective commanders can handle these 
demands better than others. Some tools, including time management, 
may also prove helpful in helping these commanders. 
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